Poker Table

THINKING ABOUT WHAT THEY’RE THINKING

Recently I came upon a note I had made a few years ago about a poker hand I played. Looking back on it, I found that it served to illustrate the important activity of thinking about what your opponents are thinking as you play. It was in $15-$30 game in which most of the other players and I were playing “overs”(so it became $30-$60 when only overs players were in the pot.)

A short while earlier in that session, in which several opponents were occasional players who were not very familiar with my play, a hand had come up which would later influence my play in the hand in question. I had picked up pocket kings in the big blind. Several players were involved, and there had been a reraise by the time the action got to me. I capped the betting at four bets. I then check-raised on the flop, was called down by one player, and won the pot in a showdown. About 20 minutes later I was dealt in the big blind.

Two players limped, a third player raised, and three more players called the raise cold. (Believe it or not, this wasn’t really that good a poker game. The preflop action in this and the previous hand had been something of an anomaly.) Believing that the limpers would probably call two more bets cold, I opted to make it three bets. I did this both in the hope of tying players onto the pot if I hit my set, and as a variation in my play to keep the determined readers off balance. Everyone called the flop came a disappointing:

For a moment I considered betting out, trying to steal the pot by representing the strong hand (e.g., AA or AKs ) that my preflop reraise had suggested. Though a case could be made for such a bet in some games, in my estimation, against this particular lineup, it was hopeless. There were many active opponents, some of whom were loose. Also, with that many players, there was a strong chance someone held at least an ace or a big heart. As this was an overs pot I couldn’t check and call either. The pot contained about $320 (seven players in for three $15 bets preflop plus part of the small blind minus the house drop), but the bet on the flop would be $30, giving me only about 12-to-1 pot odds on a 23-to-1 shot, with one of my “outs” realistically giving me only a draw.

In the next fraction of a second I realized however, that a check from me would look entirely consistent with how I had played when I check raised with the two kings out of the small blind. Maybe these guys would be “smart ” enough to check along and avoid the check-raise that I appeared to be “planning ” again. Then, maybe the free card I would get would be a lucky five. Though the five of hearts would give me only a poker draw, that was a draw I wanted to have. So I checked, and to my great satisfaction everyone did indeed check along. Now the turn came the Scratch that plan about a five.

I knew that if I checked again two things would happen.

1.The other players would decide I didn’t have anything, and

2.Someone would almost certainly bet – there were some fairly aggressive players in the game – forcing me to fold.

But all was not lost. In addition to their fear of a check-raise, everyone checking on the flop also supported the possibility that no one had much of a hand. If I bet now, it would still be consistent with the big starting hand I suspected my opponents thought I had. If everyone was weak, I might just be able to steal this pot with my little underpair. As this was an overs pot I had to bet $60 and so was getting only a little better than 5-to-1 pot odds. But the bigger bet would also be taken more seriously, and would likely shut out anyone who might otherwise think of calling with something less than an ace or a big heart.

I bet and got just one caller, a slightly better than average player who I put on the king or queen of hearts. The river paired the six, thankfully with a diamond. I bet again, and my opponent thought a bit and folded, giving me the $440 pot. At the time this seemed like quite a coup. Can I say for sure that it succeeded because I acted on the basis of what the other players were putting me on, and what they thought I was doing? No, though I suspect that some of the players had been observant enough to relate my play to the earlier hand with the pocket kings, others may have been oblivious to such history.

It may be that they just didn’t have anything. I may, in fact, have been “poker bluffing with the best hand.” Nevertheless, by considering what they were thinking, I invested my money in a situation of maximum opportunity. If you invest repeatedly in the good situations instead of the bad ones, you will make a lot of money.

The Strategic Moment in Holdem / One Way Not to Fold /

Beating the Berserko: Preflop Against a Maniac /

On Into the Storm: Playing the maniac After the Flop

One Reason to Reraise a Maniac / A Simple Read / Countering a Good Reader

Thinking About What They’re Thinking / Out On the Edge

Considerations in Two Blind Stealing Defense situations

Easing the Transition to the middle Limits: Part I

Easing the Transition to the middle Limits: Part II / Multiple Changing Images